Tuesday, January 17, 2017

Financial Inclusion: Do the poor benefit from banking ?

The conditions attached to exchanging old notes that came with the notebandi from November 8th 2016, the subsequent scarcity of cash, and the current government campaign for cashless transactions have put intense pressure on the unbanked to open bank accounts and transact with banks.

Bringing the working poor into the fold of banking - presented as a welfare initiative with its terminology of “financial inclusion” - has been an ongoing project in India. In the current phase, it has become extremely coercive.

The standard narrative (see for example a recent Live Mint piece titled “How moving money to the bank helps the poor”) is that certain obstacles prevent the working poor from accessing banks, but once these are removed, they will be able to save more, derive additional income and avail of credit on favorable terms.

The problem of access


The biggest obstacle – the problem of access to a bank for rural customers - has been acknowledged by the government for many years. The Regional Rural Banks (RRB’s) – focused on rural geographies - were first thought to be the answer. With their limitations becoming apparent, the idea of banking correspondents (BC’s) was put forward in 2006. Including BC’s, there are still too few banking outlets in rural India, particularly in less developed districts.

Take Karnataka for example. While in urban Bengaluru, there are 24 bank branches and 77 ATM’s per lakh population, when it comes to districts such as Yadgir, Bidar and Koppal, this falls to 9-11 branches, 6-8 ATM’s and 5-8 banking correspondents per lakh population (Data culled from the RBI, a report in the The Hindu and the State Level Bankers Committee, Karnataka). Given that population density is much lower in these districts compared to Bengaluru, people have to travel much longer distances than their urban counterparts to avail of banking and the bank offices that service them deal with far too many customers.

Access to banking is not only about physical access.

The working poor in both rural and urban areas are often illiterate or versed in only the local language. They have to contend with the complexities of banking in the presence of unsympathetic bank officials. The recent incident of demonetized notes being deposited and then withdrawn the same day from the accounts of 250 MNREGA workers in Rajo Majra village of Punjab, all without their knowledge shows how the poor can be exploited. The workers apparently expected government transfers into their accounts and signed bank forms that they could not read.

A large number of the working poor are migrants who move from one work site to another. Accessing their accounts – which would be with a bank branch near home – presents many problems for these workers; opening multiple bank accounts also makes no sense.

Leaving aside the obstacles in accessing formal banking services, will the poor reap benefits once forced (as in the current situation) into the formal financial system?

Do bank deposits make sense?


Take the question of savings. A recent large sample national household survey reported in Live Mint shows that the difference between income and routine consumption expenditure of households in the bottom two quintiles of income is under Rs 2000. This is the monthly saving potential of 40% of households in India. In case of unforeseen expenses such as a medical emergency, this money will have to be accessed quickly. How would it make economic sense for these households to deposit these savings in a bank? The paltry interest that can be earned will not justify the costs of banking – the time and expenses on travel.

The lack of savings potential in the poor is ironically demonstrated by the “Jan Dhan Yojana” (JDY), a scheme promoted by the government to bring the unbanked into the fold of banking. Under this program 266 million accounts had been opened till the first week of Jan 2017 with the help of some inducements such as free insurance, free debit card and some overdraft facility.

About a quarter of these accounts, 65 million, still have zero balance. The average deposit in the accounts with money was less than Rs 2300 before notebandi. By the first week of January (after the expiry of the deadline for depositing old notes) this had gone up to Rs 3400. Most JDY account holders who have been brought recently into the banking system clearly did not have much in the nature of financial assets in cash.

Bank accounts then do not make sense as a savings instrument for the poor not only because of the difficulties of accessing a bank but also because the poor hardly have any savings.

The false promise of credit


What about access to credit? Banks with their commercial objectives can obviously provide credit only to those with predictable earnings or having assets such as land or housing that can serve as collateral. The reserve bank statistics on the credit extended by banks is revealing.

There were a total of 137 million individual credit accounts in the Indian banking system in 2015. Individuals could have more than one credit account – for example one for a vehicle loan and another for a housing loan. So the number of people with access to credit from the banking system is lower. For comparison, the number of eligible voters in 2014 was about 814 million.

These 137 million borrowers can be divided into petty borrowers whose credit limit is 2 lakhs and large borrowers with a higher credit limit. There were 29 million large borrowers and their average borrowing was nearly Rs 6 lakhs each. These borrowers would typically belong to the top quintile of household income earners and avail credit for housing, vehicles, education, etc.

On the other hand, the average borrowing of 108 million petty borrowers was only Rs 50,000. These would be typically farmers and self other employed persons. These numbers show up the limits of access to credit from the banking system for poor households.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that even the farmers who have access to credit borrow from informal channels as the institutional credit available does not meet their requirements. For the self employed without assets and for informal wage workers, credit from informal sources at high interest is the only recourse. For the typical vegetable cart vendor who requires credit on a daily basis, the wholesaler in the mandi serves the function as no bank would be able to fulfill his need.

The real motivation for “financial inclusion”


The poor when provided access to banking save little and can avail of only limited credit small; they cannot be important for the profits of the banks. In the words of the former RBI governor Raghuram Rajan, banking is not easily available to the poor “not just because the financial system is underdeveloped, but because they are hard to service profitably”.

The economic non-viability of making the poor transact with banks - the BC model too may have run its course as recent studies reported in The Wire indicate -  has pushed the government to promote ever newer models of service providers to carry forward the financial inclusion project, the latest being the Payments Bank. The latter can open accounts, hold small deposits and process payments but is barred from providing credit. The thinking behind the Payments Bank concept is that with relaxed regulatory requirements, it will be able to make profits from transactions of poor account holders where regular banks are unable to.

What accounts for the persistence of the government with financial inclusion when neither the banks nor the poor account holders benefit?

The answer could lie in the fact that a bank account for every worker is an essential requirement for moving India’s massive informal economy - that supports 90% of livelihoods - in the direction of formalism. The informal economy effectively shuts out corporate India from a large part of the domestic market and the government from potential revenue. Government policy has long favored the growth of the formal/corporate economy.

“Financial inclusion” then is not so much about benefiting the poor as it is about creating the infrastructure for formalizing the informal economy. In this project, if the poor have to bear some costs, that is just collateral damage.


Wednesday, June 1, 2016

Public Infrastructure: A misplaced emphasis on highways and expressways

(The following piece appeared in India Together ; reproduced below )


Why does the government continue with its blind focus on highways and expressways when infrastructure for water supply, waste management and mass transit system is in desperate need of attention? Kannan Kasturi criticises the government's prioritization and says there is more to public infrastructure than just highways and expressways.




The usual economic justification for investing in highways is that they will have a “multiplier effect”. The argument is along these lines: highways will lead to greater efficiencies in trade and industry by allowing faster transport of goods. On the other hand, investment in “social infrastructure” – such as water or waste management - may not offer immediate benefits to the economy.
The government’s lopsided emphasis on highways is not entirely without support. It has the approval of a section of the car owning public that has discovered the joys of fast inter-city travel without the constraints imposed by public transport. But more significantly, it has had the approval of corporate India for whom it opened up another area of business.
Creating “non-performing” assets
Corporate involvement in highways was initially limited to executing government contracts. Setting itself ambitious targets for highway addition, the government came up with a new form of “Public Private Partnership” (PPP) that allowed corporations to invest in and own public highway infrastructure and earn toll income. The justification of this form of PPP – the “build operate and transfer” (BOT) toll model - was that it would bring in private investment into infrastructure and thus make possible infrastructure addition at a faster rate than would be possible with the government’s own resources.
The BOT toll model became popular very quickly. The government had in parallel made changes to policy that made it easier for banks to finance infrastructure. Corporate investments were made on the back of large scale borrowing from banks, exploiting the banking norms that allowed up to 70% debt financing for infrastructure.
Under government prodding, public sector banks who were the major corporate financiers (they account for 73% of all lending by banks in India) channeled national savings reserved for lending to infrastructure disproportionately to highway projects. According to RBI data, outstanding bank loans to the roads sector is Rs 1.8 lakh crore as of Mar 2016. 80% of bank lending for infrastructure is in just two areas - roads and power. The remaining 20% is shared between infrastructure for telecom, airports, ports and “social infrastructure”.
In the last few years, private ownership has turned the spotlight on the economics of highways. A large number of projects are unable to service their debt taken mainly from public sector banks. They have become non-performing assets (NPA’s) for the banks and this is reflected in the statistic that 50% of bank NPA’s are in the infrastructure sector which is largely just roads and power. The major role of public investment even in the BOT toll model stands exposed. The government will ultimately have to pay for the non-performing ‘highway assets’ held by the public sector banks, one way or another.
While delays in land acquisition and environmental clearance leading to cost overruns are commonly held to be the cause for non-performance, many of these projects have not had the expected initial traffic or traffic growth at the rates envisaged during planning. In particular, goods traffic growth on toll roads has been abysmal. This has resulted in toll collection – despite yearly increase in rates – falling short of debt servicing requirements. The poor traffic growth shows up the specious nature of the economic multiplier argument for highways.
The unattractive revenue from toll has pushed the government in recent times to resort to forms of engagement with private corporations where the revenues of the private partner are independent of toll collected. The contract model is once again in vogue. The government is also pushing various “annuity” models where the infrastructure companies cover the investment requirements fully or with government participation, build and operate a highway and receive an agreed amount as annual income.
In this arrangement, the government collects the toll and bears the traffic risk. In other words, the government is back to encouraging “risk free capitalism” in the roads sector. The need for these forms of engagement is telling; private corporations do not see economic justification in these highways but the government will nevertheless build them.
A recently completed mega highway project – the Yamuna Expressway - for which detailed information is available in the public domain, corroborates the general picture of the performance of recent highway projects in India. It also illustrates an alternate model of financing – “land value capture” - that has been used to build grandiose economically unviable highways.
The Yamuna Expressway – a case study
The Yamuna Expressway project connecting Noida (on the outskirts of Delhi) to Agra was initiated in 2001 by the BJP Government in UP lead by Rajnath Singh. It was to be a six lane access controlled highway. The economic justification provided for the project was typical: besides encouraging tourism, the highway would “open up avenues for industrial and urban development” of the region.
The Jaypee Group, one of only two bidders, was selected for the project during Mayawati’s tenure as CM of UP. The private partner would make the entire investment and have rights to the toll. Anticipating that toll revenues would be inadequate, the government came up with a scheme where the builder could recover his investment in the expressway through “land value capture”.
The government would acquire land along the expressway and pass this on to the builder for developing urban townships. The value of the land was expected to go up for several reasons - the change in land use from agricultural to urban (residential, commercial, industrial) decreed by the government and the speedy access to Delhi and Agra via the expressway from these pockets.
A CAG audit of the partnership agreement carried out in 2012 was extremely damning. It found that the government of the day accepted the cost and revenue projections of the developer without any independent analysis. It also recorded that the government allowed the developer to actually select the location of the land parcels! Nearly three fifths of the 2500 hectares of the land selected was in the National Capital Region. 500 hectares was prime real estate in Noida.
It took till 2007 for the UP Government to decide on the alignment of the expressway after which the newly formed Jaypee Infratech began project execution. The project was completed ahead of time and what is touted as India’s most advanced highway was opened to traffic in Aug 2012.
As is the case with most highway projects, the traffic projections for Yamuna Expressway turned out to be wild. An average of 16490 vehicles used the highway per day in 2014-15 against the expected 100,000. The annual revenue from toll for that year was only Rs 168 crore on a highway on which the company claimed to have invested Rs 9962 crore. (For comparison, the annual investment in the railways which transports 13 million passengers a day is now around Rs 40,000 crore.)
True to the general pattern, the project expenses were met mainly through borrowing from banks. Jaypee Infratech’s debt stood at more than Rs 8700 crore as of Sept 2015.
The low traffic indicates that the hopes of the access controlled “world class” expressway spurring economic development in the region were misplaced. Some of the reasons for the low traffic are related to the very conception and design of the highway. Access control has meant that people of towns and villages along the Yamuna banks cannot use the highway and will not reap the benefits of faster travel and transport to the metros. The high toll on the expressway has kept potential users away despite heavy congestion on the alternative NH 2.
Even the Taj tourist does not seem to have benefited greatly. While the 165 km length of the expressway can be negotiated in 100 minutes, the congested roads from Delhi to Noida (where the expressway begins) and the drive through Agra to the Taj bring home the reality of roads in urban India.
Financing highways through land capture
The land along the course of the expressway is fertile canal irrigated three crop farmland. Farmers co-operated with the government when land was being acquired for the highway. However the government’s move to acquire land to hand over to the company for urban enclaves met with resistance. The government used time tested methods to harass farmers – disconnecting electricity supply, stopping cultivation and implicating them in false cases.
The government agency acquiring land has the high sounding name of “Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority” (YEIDA). It has plans of ‘developing’ much more land along the Expressway - a draft master plan of Feb 2011 shows no less than 58000 hectares earmarked for development! Among the first acts of ‘development’ of YEIDA was acquiring and transferring 2500 acres of land in Greater Noida to the Jaypee Group for a race course and a “sports city".
In the run up to the inaugural Formula 1 race at the racecourse built on their land, farmers in the villages of Bhatta & Parsaul at the outskirts of Delhi protested demanding that their land be returned. Clashes took place between farmers and the police in which four people lost their lives. Subsequently, the government let loose a reign of terror on the hapless villagers. Thus was acquired the land which would pay for the expressway.
Farmers were paid an average of Rs 35 lakh/acre by the government for the 6175 acres of land acquired along the expressway. The expressway builder paid the government on average Rs 44 lakh/acre. By 2013, the company had sold a 300 acre piece of this land lying near the race track to a real estate company at Rs 5 crore/acre!
Fifteen years after the project was conceived even the urban enclaves along the expressway have not materialized, let alone industry. However, the rural agricultural economy has been made poorer with the loss of large tracts of fertile irrigated land.
Why not social infrastructure?
The overall experience of highway development in India over the last 15 years is of low traffic volumes and slow traffic growth. Toll revenues do not provide an adequate return on the investment in these highways. Low traffic growth also exposes the specious nature of the “economic multiplier” argument. 
The question that presents itself is this:  why does the government continue with its blind focus on highways and expressways despite this negative experience?
There is no shortage of infrastructure outside highways that is in desperate need of attention. The low priority for water infrastructure has made the country extremely vulnerable to vagaries of nature. This is seen in the terrible scarcity of even drinking water affecting a large part of the country today. The lack of adequate waste management has polluted all the lakes and rivers near our urban areas and is rapidly making our cities unlivable.
The central government cannot absolve itself of responsibility by claiming that “social infrastructure” is in the domain of the states. It is high time it changes priorities from “world class expressways” that will benefit only corporate interests to infrastructure that has an immediate impact on the life of the average citizen.

Thursday, March 3, 2016

How private thermal projects have fared?

This piece appeared in EPW. Reproduced in full below. The figures and tables have been copied from EPW.

Private Thermal Power in a Liberal Policy Regime


The Electricity Act, 2003 and the National Electricity Policy, 2005 put in place a highly liberal policy regime for private thermal electricity generators.

Licensing was done away with. Techno-economic clearance from the Central Electricity Authority was no longer necessary. Generators were provided open access to the transmission network, owned with but a few exceptions by state and central utilities. They could supply power to any part of India. Generators were also freed from having to enter into long term (12-25 year) power purchase agreements with distribution companies which limited profit margins. They could opt for shorter term contracts as well as sell in the power markets through traders and power exchanges.

The liberal regime resulted in an explosion of interest from private companies. This paper follows the development of private thermal power projects over a decade to determine the major impacts of this policy regime and to critique it.

Sources of data

Comprehensive data on private thermal projects is not available from a single source. With the end of the licensing regime, the Central Electricity Authority (CEA) has stopped monitoring projects except when they are close to becoming operational. Power projects however have to obtain Environmental Clearance (EC) and the Ministry of Environment, Forest, and Climate Change (MoEF) keeps track of projects that have begun the process leading to EC. Even before starting the EC process, companies typically sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the government of the state where their project is located. Additionally, companies intending to access the inter-state transmission network register access requests with the central transmission utility. A composite picture of projects in different stages of development can be pieced together from all this disparate data.

It is a painstaking task to obtain clean summary data from the MoEF database. The task can be simplified by limiting it to a subset of all India data. The choice of the subset is explained below.

India is divided into five regions in the context of electricity generation and distribution – the Southern, Northern, Western, Eastern and North Eastern Regions - defined by a transmission infrastructure that allows power generated in any state in a region to be conveyed to any other state in the same region. Electricity generated in any of these regions is largely consumed within the same region.

The highest build up of private thermal capacity in the period from 2008 (about when the earliest thermal plants conceived in the new regime would have become operational) to 2015 has been in the Western Region - composed of the states of Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Maharashtra and Goa - accounting for over 57% of the all India addition to private thermal generation capacity (Table 1).This justifies the use of data limited to the Western Region for the analysis in this paper.


The great thermal power rush

The extant of private interest in thermal power projects can be gauged from the number of projects with EC. Companies with EC for a project would have tied up with the state government for public land and water and have a plan for fuel supply. They would also have completed the mandatory “public hearing” in the project area – a gathering that is often an outlet for public opposition to a project. Only serious players would have obtained EC for their projects. (Kasturi, 2011:10)

There are two things noteworthy about private thermal projects that have obtained EC in the Western Region.

One is the sheer magnitude of the capacity planned - 79 private thermal power projects, with a combined generation capacity of 92 GW (Table 2). The latter figure can be better appreciated if it is kept in mind that all India addition of private thermal generation in the 11th plan (2007-2012) was 19 GW and the Planning Commission deemed 64 GW of thermal power addition (private and public included) during the 12th plan period (2012-2017) sufficient to meet the requirements of the country with GDP growing at nine percent (Planning Commission, 2012:1.4.1)! The government of the day appears to have been fully aware that many of these proposals would not fructify.

Second is the bunching of proposals between 2006 and 2010 (Table 2). The interest in projects rapidly peaked and had all but petered out by 2011. There has been no fresh private interest in thermal plants in the Western Region since 2011 (with but one or two exceptions who do not have EC yet). The negative consequences of this bunching are briefly touched upon later. The changing interest in thermal power strongly relates to the rapidly changing economics of thermal power production of this period.

With permission to sell electricity in the market, captive generators made good profits in the prevailing conditions of electricity scarcity, early on under the liberal regime established by the Electricity Act, 2003. Jindal Steel and Power (JSP), a captive generator itself, went on to establish a thermal plant in 2007 operating exclusively as a merchant supplier without any long term power purchase agreements (PPA’s) and made super profits during the period 2007 to 2010 (Joshi, 2009). The success of merchant producers and JSP in particular very likely attracted many entrants into thermal power.

From 2010, the situation turned unfavourable. With the production of coal stagnating, the government stopped giving long term coal linkages to power plants from 2011. International coal prices increased rapidly all of 2010, peaking in early 2011 and importing fuel was not a good option. The biggest dampener was that merchant electricity rates dropped sharply during the second half of 2010 and thereafter stayed low in the Western Region (Figure 1). Other regions with the sole exception of the Southern Region also showed similar falling prices.


Under these changed circumstances, many thermal projects were put on hold and others abandoned.

The cost of stalled and abandoned projects

Chhattisgarh in the Western Region is a case study of some of the excesses and “externalities” of the new policy regime. The state advertised itself as the upcoming “power hub”, an exporter of electricity to the rest of the country, and signed as many as 61 MOU’s for thermal power.

40 projects, two thirds of the number proposed, have not completed the formalities needed for environment clearance (Table 3). All these projects were announced many years ago and the overriding reason for them not to have progressed appears to be the changed economics of thermal power generation described earlier. Of the 21 projects with EC, 10 are operational, mostly with only partial capacity on stream (Table 3). A few are under construction but extremely delayed. A few others appear to be stalled. In all, only about a quarter of the proposed thermal projects in Chhattisgarh may materialize.

For proponents of competition the failure of some projects may not be of concern. The failed projects however not just cost their investors. They come at great cost to the agricultural communities amidst whom they are located. Almost all stalled projects with EC have acquired all the land they would have needed and the land requirement for thermal plants is substantial – 700 to 900 acres for every 1000 MW plant. At least 17 of the projects that have not even obtained EC have acquired part or all of the land for their proposed plants. The early land acquisition has been encouraged by government itself in the past for providing coal linkages which in turn was necessary for obtaining EC (Kasturi, 2011:11).

Skewed addition of generation capacity

Private thermal generation plants that have proliferated under the new policy regime have aggravated the imbalance between installed generation capacity and energy requirement in the different regions (Figure 2). The Western Region has become relatively capacity surplus while the North and South regions have a capacity deficit. Given that nearly half of the increase in total all India generation capacity came from private thermal plants and that nearly 64% of this was in the Western Region, this region was bound to become relatively over endowed with generation capacity (Table 1).



The surplus capacity in some regions and capacity deficit in others may not be an issue if there is adequate inter-regional transmission capacity. Starting from 2010, the market has existed for export of electricity from Western Region to the Southern Region. The relative electricity surplus in the Western Region (WR) and deficit in the Southern Region (SR) is seen in the different prices registered for the two regions at the IEX (Figure 1). The problems of inter-regional transmission are illustrated by the WR-SR energy exchanges.

Actual imports from WR into SR increased only marginally from 2010 through 2013, limited by the nominal transmission capacity (Table 4). The nominal transmission capacity cannot be entirely utilized in practice as margins need to be kept aside for technical reasons; the table also shows actual imports.


Capacity enhancements happened in 2014 with the opening of the first of two 2100 MW links between Sholapur in Maharashtra and Raichur in Karnataka. However, even with the much higher nominal transmission capacity available, the average power transferred from Western to the Southern region went up only by small amounts.

The reason behind this is that power transfers require end to end transmission capacity between generating centres and load centres. Even if the inter-regional transmission capacity - which is the capacity of links across the region borders – is adequate, there may be bottlenecks elsewhere on the end-to-end corridor. In the present case, the transmission capacity from WR generating clusters (such as those in Chhattisgarh) to Sholapur and from Raichur to the SR load centres is lacking. In 2014-15, only 1172 MW of power, equivalent to a capacity transfer of 1500 MW or about 0.6% of all India generation capacity for the year, could be transferred from WR to SR. [2] This was far below Southern Regions requirement and Western Regions available surplus (Figure 3).

Idle generators amidst electricity scarcity

The skewed regional addition of generation capacity in the new policy regime has its direct consequences. The plant load factor (PLF) has serially decreased in the Western Region except for Gujarat, and is now at 43% (Table 5).

While coal availability would have been considered the problem some years back, it appears that it is no longer so. In FY15, coal India production increased by 32 MT, more than the cumulative increases in production in the previous four years. Coal stocks in state plants have gone up. International coal prices have come down. The problem appears to be that there are no customers for the power generated by these power producers.


The electricity distribution companies (discoms) in the Western Region cannot absorb more power in their current situation. This of course does not mean that electricity has reached every household in this region or that there is round the clock supply. It only means that the discoms have met their stated requirements – limited by their transmission network, their distribution reach and their financial ability to buy more power. Export to the Southern Region – where Karnataka is facing a severe electricity crisis because of a deficit monsoon crippling its hydropower generation – is not possible because of lack of transmission capacity. These power producers have been stranded.

Issues in developing generation and transmission capacity in step

Before the advent of the new regime, electricity generation in India was planned to keep each region self sufficient. States developed their generation and transmission infrastructure in tandem. The centre, while establishing new generating units in a state also developed the inter-state and inter-regional transmission systems required to deliver the power to the states allocated power from the unit. In addition, a few transmission links were built by the centre across region boundaries specifically to exchange power.

The National Electricity Policy, 2005 declares that network planning and implementation should be based on the transmission needs arising from the open access regime and not contingent on a prior agreement with the users (MoP, 2005:5.3.2). Considering that generating units can target customers anywhere in the country and transmission systems are expensive and have to be built with long term needs in mind, this appears to be wishful thinking under present conditions of India.

Optimal design of transmission systems requires knowledge of the location, capacity and time frame of commissioning of each new generation plant as well as its intended customers. Multiple agencies must work to enhance intra-state, inter-state and inter-regional networks in a coordinated manner to ensure the required transmission capacity end to end (CEA 2012:7.4.2).

Transmission planning has become extremely difficult in the new regime as power plants are no longer required to enter into long term PPA’s with distribution utilities. Many private generation plants staking claims for long term access to the transmission network have not specified end users for their power as they have not (on purpose) or could not (because of lack of tenders) enter into long term PPAs with distribution utilities. Further, they are not accountable for their schedule of commissioning (PGCIL, 2010).

For the transmission utilities, as of now almost entirely owned by the states and the centre, the above uncertainties put at risk the investment in transmission infrastructure and can lead to a situation where there is sub-optimal utilization of the network. Generation plants on the other hand can be denied access because of congestion, as is happening today (Planning Commission 2012:2.2.2).

Concluding remarks

The extremely liberal regime ushered in by the Electricity Act 2003 allowed the few existing private captive thermal generators to make handsome profits. This attracted a large number of private companies to venture into thermal power generation, particularly in certain regions with perceived advantages in terms of availability of coal and water. The changing economics of thermal power production however quickly lead to this interest petering out.

The majority of proposed projects were abandoned, but not without cost to the communities of the area they were to be located in. Of the rest, only a few are operational with partial capacity while others are under construction with delayed schedules or have gone into limbo.

The location of the functional plants serves to further exacerbate the regional imbalance between demand and generation capacity. Not being able to sell their electricity locally because of lack of immediate demand and in power deficit regions because of the lack of adequate transmission capacity to load centres, these plants idle or run at low PLF’s even as parts of the country reel under severe electricity shortage. The overall development of the private thermal power sector shows a far from optimal utilization of national resources.

There are yet other negative consequences for the electricity sector which are not detailed in this paper. The rush to build thermal plants created a spurt in demand for capital equipment that was taken advantage of by foreign manufactures at the cost of domestic manufacturing. This is apparent in the details of executing agencies and equipment suppliers of private plants captured by CEA (CEA, 2015). State owned banks, the main lenders to dysfunctional power projects are burdened with huge non-performing assets (Acharya, 2012). This also makes it harder for newer entrants into the power sector to obtain financing for their projects.

Each of these problems can be seen as caused by a failure of coordination, adequate due diligence and so on. Taken together, they point to the infirmities in the legal and policy framework. The framework acknowledges the heavily capital intensive nature of the industry and the need for a planned approach to electricity for the optimal utilization of national resources to serve the economy. Yet it allows private generation companies unfettered freedom to set up plants without reference to timing, location or quantity all in the name of efficiency through competition.

The present government meanwhile has shifted its focus to solar energy. It is pushing humungous targets for solar generation capacity addition - reminiscent of the previous governments push for thermal energy - without addressing any of the issues that have severely impacted thermal energy development.

References

— (2015): “Monthly Report on Broad Status of Thermal Projects in the Country, April 2015,” Central Electricity Authority, Ministry of Power, 29 May.
Kasturi, Kannan (2011): “New Thermal Power Clusters,” Economic & Political Weekly, 1 October.
MoP (2005): “National Electricity Policy 2005,” Ministry of Power, 12 February, available in http://pib.nic.in/archieve/others/2005/nep20050209.pdf.
Joshi, Rishi (2009): “Merchant of Power,” Business Today, 4th October


Notes:


[1] Average actual utilized capacity (MW)  = (Actual transfer in a year (MU)) * (1000/(24*365))
[2] The equivalent generation capacity has been arrived at by assuming a plant operating at 75% PLF to generate  1172 MW

Tuesday, March 1, 2016

Modi Government's solar policy - 1:

(A piece I wrote on the Modi Government's solar plans that has been carried in The Wire ; reproduced below )

Solar Energy: Too much, too fast ?



The Narendra Modi government’s aggressive push for renewable energy, seeking to increase its share in the electric supply from the current 7% to nearly 19% by 2022, has been greeted with much enthusiasm all round. What is most striking is the target for solar capacity, which has gone up five-fold to an eye catching 100 GW. Till recently, 100 GW was the official estimate of India’s solar potential in the “medium-term” – till 2032. As justification for its aggressive target, the government points to the price of solar approaching “grid parity” and the international commitments it has made to increase the use of non-fossil-fuel sources of energy.
While energy generated without emissions is generally welcome, the rapid penetration of solar energy into the grid on the scale planned will present major problems for the state distribution utilities. In particular, it will make it difficult for them to meet another commitment made by the government to the people of India of providing “24 hours supply of adequate and uninterrupted power”.
The problems associated with solar electricity on the grid stem from the variability of solar generation. The output of a solar power plant varies with the movement of the sun and follows a bell shaped curve with a peak around noon. Cloudy or foggy conditions lower output and moving clouds can cause rapid fluctuations.
The variability of solar generation (and more generally of all renewable energy generation) is something the utilities need to handle as they must maintain a balance at all times between electricity supply and demand on the grid. Balancing becomes more challenging with increasing penetration of renewable energy.
Balancing supply and demand
Balancing is not a new requirement.  Even if generation on the grid is not variable, balancing requirements will arise from daily variations in demand. The average all India pattern of demand variation is a higher day time demand compared to the night time load and a sharp peak in the late evening. Load balancing is achieved by varying supply from conventional – coal, gas, hydro – power plants. These plants come with a range of characteristics which define their use in balancing.
Older subcritical coal-fired plants have low flexibility as they were designed to provide a steady output. Frequent output changes in these plants leads to wear and tear with attendant costs. Newer supercritical coal-fired plants are more flexible and resilient than the older subcritical plants by design. Gas-fired and hydro power plants with reservoirs are the most flexible and their output can be changed rapidly to handle changing load.
On an all India scale, coal-fired plants provide a steady output – to meet what is called the base load – while gas-fired plants and hydro plants with storage are managed to respond to variations in demand. With gas being expensive, hydro generators are used, wherever possible, to meet demand peaks.
A problem for the states
However, it is at the state level that balancing problems come to the fore.
That is because in India’s federal structure, states (and utilities within the state) are responsible for balancing supply and demand on their own grid. For this, they require a mix of conventional generators with different levels of flexibility that is adequate to meet the variations in load and renewable supply on their grid. However, all states do not have access to the different resources in the right measure.
Tamil Nadu, which has a large wind power capacity, is a good case study. Balancing requirements arise from both load and supply variations. The uncertainty associated with wind power generation adds to the complexity. While the state has significant reservoir-based hydro capacity, its ability to use this for balancing is restricted by irrigation release schedules and periods of high inflows into reservoirs when hydro power generation cannot be curtailed.
When wind power generation is greater than expected, the state utility, lacking flexible balancing resources, has to back down power from coal plants or refuse wind power. Either option results in objections from the other party – violating contract provisions in one case and not respecting the “must-run” status in the other – and the dispute is now in the courts. Legal issues aside, there are negative economic consequences either way. Varying power from coal plants means underutilisation of capacity and higher costs related to wear and tear. Backing down wind power means wasted energy.
Are we prepared for large-scale renewable energy?
The different types of long gestation infrastructure needed to handle large scale penetration of renewable energy on the grid are known from government sponsored studies dating to 2012 and 2013. These are broadly inter-state transmission lines, grid level storage and adequate flexible generation resources.
Transmission corridors carrying renewable energy across state boundaries would bring balancing resources over a larger area into play. In storage, these studies identified pumped storage projects – where energy is stored in water pumped from lower reservoirs into upper reservoirs – as a good option as there were a number of potential sites in India. Additionally, these projects would also support flexible generation.
Based on 12th plan targets for capacity addition (which included 56 GW of renewable energy), it was estimated that by 2017 only 60% of the balancing power requirements would be met by flexible generation from the planned pumped storage, hydro and gas plants. The remaining would have to be met using the less flexible supercritical coal plants. After steeply raising the renewable energy target to 175 GW by 2022, how is the government preparing the grid for it?
The only preparation underway is in the area of establishing inter-state transmission corridors (termed ‘Green Energy Corridors’). These were already under implementation for existing renewable energy sites in Tamil Nadu, Gujarat and Rajasthan and the present government has enlarged their scope to include its “ultra mega solar parks”.
There is no visible movement on augmenting pumped storage capacity. Among new grid-level storage technologies, electro-chemical technologies (batteries, capacitors) may be the most suitable for Indian requirements. These technologies are however still five to ten years from commercialisation and as yet only one large battery storage plant (>10 MW with 4 hrs supply) is in operation worldwide.
Even if the government projections for addition of flexible generation capacity hold, the planned growth in renewable generation will far outpace it. In fact, capacity addition is likely to fall short by a large margin with problems with both gas-fired plants and hydro plants – expensive imported fuel in one case and environmental issues in the other.
Given the above, flexible generation resources will be grossly inadequate to meet balancing requirements by 2022. Coal-fired plants, both supercritical and subcritical, will have to be used for balancing and utilities, lacking adequate flexibility to handle supply variations, will be forced to resort to supply interruptions and load shedding.
The real cost of solar
Problems of balancing aside, there is also the issue of cost. Utilities are extremely price conscious and will not contract solar energy if it is more expensive than other sources. After solar producers offered to sell NTPC electricity at rates of Rs 4.63/unit in AP last year and at Rs 4.34/unit in Rajasthan early this year, the Minister of Power was quick to announce that solar energy prices had reached “near grid parity”. This statement is misleading.
NTPC is able to sell this power to utilities only because it “bundles” it with cheaper power from its old coal-fired plants and offers them power at the “bundled” rate lower than its purchase price for solar electricity. It is this bundled price that must approach “grid parity” – the average contracted price of electricity on the grid for the utility – for NTPC to be able to find buyers.
Then again, even after reaching “grid parity”, solar can prove to be expensive. Its true cost to the utility is not just the price at which it has been purchased. The cost of balancing – be it the cost of storage or the cost of coal capacity held in reserve – must also be attributed to solar generation.
Future shocks
The government’s announcement of massive solar energy targets therefore appears to be an impetuous decision. States will be unwilling to allow high penetration of solar energy into their grids considering its cost and the problems of addressing its variability. That is why the central government is all set to force the issue by increasing renewable purchase obligations. The new tariff policy states that solar electricity must constitute 8% of non-hydro power consumed by every utility by 2022.
Forcing the issue will have consequences for the quality of electricity supply. The limited arsenal in their hands to deal with supply variability will make it difficult for state utilities to fulfil the commitment of adequate and uninterrupted power supply 24 hours a day. The central government anticipates the need for curtailing demand. That is why it is pushing for the large-scale installation of smart meters that can support time-of-day tariff and facilitate demand reduction.
Savings on carbon emission would come from capacity underutilisation of coal plants, an expensive strategy for India. With no storage available on the grid, coal plants will be needed as backup, and installation of new solar plants will not lower the requirement for new coal plants.
India may be better served by a plan that looks at developing solar and other renewable energy generation in step with cost effective storage and flexible generation that is available to all states. Such a combination would reduce carbon emission by reducing the need for new coal plants. If such a plan entails slower adoption of solar generation, that may not altogether be bad; solar plants, as long term trends suggest, will only get cheaper with time.

Sunday, February 21, 2016

Idle Generators and power deficit

India Together published this piece which deals with how thermal plants are idle in some parts of the country even while other parts are facing a severe power crisis. Reproduced below:

ELECTRICITY CONUNDRUM

Idle generators in the midst of power deficit

The Southern region of India is expected to face high energy deficit this year while the Western and Eastern region will have a surplus of energy generation. Kannan Kasturi explains why such regional skew in energy generation and energy consumption exists and what it will take to resolve it.

Southern India is expected to face a severe electricity shortage this year. The Central Electricity Authority (CEA) in its latest annual forecast anticipates the energy deficit in the southern electricity grid to be over 11 percent, equivalent to a generation capacity deficit of 4000 MW. For Karnataka and Telangana, the forecasted energy deficit is greater than 16 percent.
Historically, India has been divided into five regional grids from an electricity distribution perspective – the Southern, Northern, Western, Eastern and North Eastern. The CEA forecasts a small deficit for the Northern region and a surplus for the Western and Eastern regions. The North Eastern region, while accounting for only a tiny fraction of all India electricity consumption, is also expected to have a large deficit.
The annual forecast results from an exercise, in which the electricity requirement and the available power for each state is collected and vetted by the CEA. The sources of power considered are both the public sector plants (belonging to the central or state governments) and private plants; however the forecast takes into account only firm contracts that are already in place between power producers and the distribution companies.
Energy deficit states may improve their power availability in the short term by buying electricity from surplus states during the year. It is also possible that actual demand turns out to be lower than projected demand, leading to a lower deficit. The numbers as they stand, however, predict a reversal of three years of decreasing power deficit in the southern region.
Before proceeding further, some clarification about CEA demand projections is in order. These projections are ultimately obtained from the electricity distribution companies (discoms) in the states and do not capture the full extent of demand for the following reasons.
The projections made by discoms are based on actual current usage and a projected rate of growth of demand for each category of customer, based on past trends. They are made assuming the limitations of the existing distribution network. The latent demand from a population left without service by the existing network, or from areas provided limited energy due to network limitations, do not figure in the demand projections.
Another issue with the demand projections is that discoms are supposed to compensate for the lower current usage figures resulting from scheduled and unscheduled power cuts (for example, the curtailed supply to irrigation pump sets).
Discoms by and large are not transparent about the power cuts they impose and the power outages due to faults, making independent estimation of the ‘unconstrained demand’ – the likely demand in the absence of power outages – very difficult. The CEA demand and deficit projections for the different regions need to be understood in the light of the above.
The regional skew in energy generation
Why do some regions have energy deficit and others have an energy surplus? Historically, electricity generation capacity was planned to keep each region self sufficient. Each state had its own power plants and the central government, while building plants in any region, also built the transmission systems to distribute power to the states in the region. Inter-regional transmission systems came up only on a case by case basis, typically if a part of the power from a central generating unit located in one region had been promised to a state in a neighbouring region.
The following graphic shows how power generation capacity and energy consumption have changed in recent years across the regions. Rather than absolute numbers, generation capacity and energy consumption for each region are shown as fractions of the all India capacity and consumption.
This shows the increasing imbalance between generation and consumption in some regions. (Note: The generation capacity pertains to Dec 2009 and Mar 2015 respectively. The energy requirement for 2015-16 is as per CEA projection).
The Eastern (including North East) and Western regions have a greater share of energy generation than their share of energy consumption. The opposite is true for the Northern and Southern regions. Moreover, this proportion (of electricity generated to electricity consumed) has significantly fallen in the southern region and significantly increased in the western region in recent years.
The missing transmission
Electricity surplus in some regions co-existing with electricity deficit in other regions points to problems in wheeling electricity between the surplus and deficit regions. The rapid build-up of generating capacity in the western region requires a simultaneous build-up of transmission capacity to evacuate the power to the energy deficient regions. That this has not happened will become clear from the price pattern of electricity traded in the market in the different regions.
Electricity producers sell their surplus electricity in the short term electricity market after they have met their long and medium term contractual obligations. Over 40 percent (2013-14 figures) of the electricity that is available for sale in the market is traded through the Indian Energy Exchange (IEX).
The graphic below shows the average price of electricity traded at IEX in the western region states of Maharashtra, MP and Gujarat and the southern region states of TN, Kerala and Pondicherry.
(Note: The units of the y axis are Rs/Mwh and not Rs/Kwh as incorrectly shown)
Since 2010, the prices in the southern region have ruled significantly higher than in the western region indicating that there are barriers to moving the electricity generated from the west to the south. The price in these western states has been range bound between Rs 2-4 /kwh from 2012 and below Rs 3/kwh since Nov 2014. The price in Chhattisgarh which is also part of the western electricity grid remains marginally lower. The range bound price over an extended period indicates that electricity supply may not be a constraint in this region.
IEX data shows that in the Northern region too, electricity tends to trade at a higher price than the western and eastern regions; however the price differences are not very large suggesting that the transmission capacity from east and west into the north may be nearly adequate. In fact, an examination of inter-regional flow data shows that power import into the northern region has been steadily increasing from an average 2800 MW in 2010-11 to 5300 MW in 2014-15, compensating for the deficit in energy generation capacity.
The power import into the southern region, on the other hand, has only marginally increased from an average 1200 MW to 1800 MW between 2009-10 and 2014-15 (This does not include about 1800 MW of power from an NTPC plant in Talcher, Orissa which is exclusively meant for the southern region and for which a dedicated transmission line exists).
The Central Government has periodically trumpeted the new inter-regional transmission capacity additions. Prime Minister Modi personally inaugurated the second of two Raichur-Sholapur transmission lines in August 2014. Together, the two lines were supposed to add 4200 MW of transmission capacity from the western to the southern region. As of June 2015, the increased capacity available has been less than a tenth of this at around 400 MW.
The reason behind this, it turns out, is that crucial transmission links from the generation clusters in the western region to its periphery with the southern region, which will allow the full utilisation of the Raichur-Sholapur lines, are delayed.
Other high capacity links from Chhattisgarh to Telangana and Tamil Nadu have also been stuck with the centre at the planning stage despite representations from the concerned states. The lack of urgency in implementing these projects, one suspects, may have something to do with political considerations.
After the government opened up power production to the private sector, the coal-bearing states of the western region – MP, Chhattisgarh, and Maharashtra – became the preferred destinations for private companies seeking to exploit the cost advantages of pit head power plants. This is the reason for the disproportionate build up of power generation capacity in the western region. The inability to deliver power to the load centres in the south has meant that many new plants are idling or operating much below capacity.
Even as the thermal (coal-based) generation capacity of private producers in these three states has gone up from 5.7 GW in April 2009 to 26.4 GW in April 2015, the Plant Load Factor (PLF) of these plants, the capacity usage indicator, has come down from 83.5 percent to 43.1 percent. Coal availability has not been an issue since 2014 because of higher production, adequate imports and low international prices. Low capacity utilisation is a consequence of the inability to sell the electricity.

The problem clearly is that generation capacity has increased without adequate expansion in transmission capacity connecting it to power deficit load centres. The greed of the private promoters who did not tie up their production in long term contracts with discoms, hoping instead to make quick profits through merchant sales, is partly to blame.
Merchant selling - sales against short term contracts - allows the producer to charge prevailing market prices for electricity. Some years back, independent merchant producers made a killing in an environment of scarcity. Long term contracts, however, are based on competitive bidding by different producers and will not yield such high margins. But long term contracts would have kept the focus on building the necessary transmission links.
The major part of the blame must fall on the central government. Plants unable to sell electricity translates to banks, mainly public sector ones, saddled with non-performing assets. Further, operational plants are only a part of the problem. In the coal-bearing states in the same region, work is at a standstill in many more plants that are in various stages of development, awaiting better prices for electricity.
The government has clearly failed in its responsibility of overall planning of the electricity network and allowed scarce national capital to be wasted in generation capacity that cannot be utilised.