Showing posts with label energy policy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label energy policy. Show all posts

Saturday, February 11, 2017

Modi government's solar policy - 2 :

Is the government’s overly aggressive solar thrust in public interest?


(This piece appeared in the Feb 11th issue of EPW ; reproduced below)

Shortly after coming to power the Modi government declared a fivefold increase in the 2022 target for solar generation capacity in the country to an eye popping 100 GW. Less than a year earlier, India’s electricity establishment had estimated 100GW to be India’s solar potential till 2032 (MoP 2014:22)! To see the numbers in perspective, India’s current solar capacity is less than 8 GW.

The target has been set without reference to the coal-fired capacity addition in progress and at a time when capacity utilization of existing thermal plants is very low and there is a large uncertainty on how electricity demand will develop in the next few years (Singh 2016, Tongia 2016:6).

The only argument the government has offered in favour of its aggressive solar thrust is that this would help India meet its international commitments on carbon emissions (GOI, 2015a). There have been questions raised about whether such a rapid build-up of non-fossil fuel capacity is indeed necessary to meet these commitments (Tongia 2016:17). These have remained unanswered.

The government estimates the investment requirement for 100 GW of solar generation to be of the order of Rs 6 lakh crores. Globally, RE is a favourite of investors and the government’s solar program has been enthusiastically received. Foreign investors such as SunEdison, SkyPower, Fortum India and SoftBank and Indian business houses including Adani, Tata and Mahindra have aggressively participated in the large solar tenders. Competition is fierce and the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy has had to hire large halls to accommodate all interested players during pre-bid meetings (Kenning 2015)!

How will such an aggressive solar program impact India’s electricity distribution companies? How will it affect the cost, availability and quality of electricity for consumers? Is the pace of solar adoption pushed by the government in public interest? These are some questions that this paper attempts to answer.

1.    Challenges of renewable energy on the grid


The thrust of the government is entirely on grid connected solar energy. A little background is useful to understand the challenge this poses for electricity distribution.

Electricity demand typically varies round the clock. For example, the all India average pattern shows a higher demand during the day than at night with a sharp late evening peak (PGCIL 2012: 57). It is a basic requirement of a stable electricity grid that demand and supply be “balanced”, or in other words, matched at all times and over different time scales.

Balancing demand and supply


There are several options for balancing. On the supply side, the output of power plants can be controlled to follow demand. On the demand side, the options can be to store energy when there is excess supply and to curtail demand forcibly or through economic disincentives when there is a deficit.

Conventional power plants – such as coal, gas-fired and reservoir based hydro power - are amenable to output control to varying extents. Their use in balancing is determined by their operational “flexibility” - the range over which their output can be changed and the rate at which the change can be made. The capacity available for flexible use is termed “balancing capacity”.

The output of gas-fired and hydro power plants with reservoirs can be changed rapidly and over a large range to handle changing load. These plants are high in flexibility. The old (“subcritical”) coal-fired plants were designed to provide a steady output. Output changes in these plants happen relatively slowly and over a smaller range and frequent output changes can lead to wear and tear with attendant costs. These plants are low on flexibility. Newer “supercritical” coal-fired plants are by design more flexible and resilient than the older subcritical plants (PGCIL 2012: 120-124).

Currently, demand is typically assessed from load profiles from the past (previous day, same day previous week or year) which can give an indication of the load variations to be expected. Conventional generators are scheduled to match the expected load.

The intra-day variation in demand is addressed mainly by varying output of reservoir based hydro plants. Coal plants provide the “base load” and their output is varied only in a small range (PGCIL 2012:125). In recent years, this range has been expanding steadily indicating need for increasing balancing capacity (MoP 2016b: 28). The use of gas-fired plants in balancing has been discouraged by non-availability of gas and high price.

When there is insufficient supply, “load shedding” is resorted to. The Indian grid has hardly any storage capacity available as the need for storage solutions has not been acutely felt in the past.

Implications of renewable energy for balancing


The presence of solar energy generators on the grid makes balancing more challenging for several reasons. One is that electricity regulation in India incentivizes solar energy by conferring a “must run” status on solar generators; their entire output must be accepted into the grid. This makes solar power plants “inflexible” from a balancing standpoint.

A second is that solar power is variable. Solar power plants produce power only in daylight hours and their output varies with the movement of the sun, peaking at midday. Balancing now needs to be carried out for load as well as supply variability.

A third reason is that solar output is dependent on weather. Cloudy or foggy conditions lower output and introduce intermittency into the variations. The expected output under such conditions, obtained from models using weather forecasting data, has to be available sufficiently in advance to enable scheduling of conventional generators for balancing. Since weather is not entirely predictable, actual generation will show deviations from forecasts and these have to be handled in real time.

Wind mills are the other major source of renewable energy (RE) in the Indian context. Together with solar, they account for over 90% (160 GW) of the RE target for 2022. These plants also have a “must run” status and produce output that is variable and influenced by weather conditions. From a balancing perspective, they have issues similar to solar.

Balancing areas in India’s federal electricity setup


There is another dimension to balancing that derives from India’s federal electricity setup - electricity provisioning is a state government responsibility. Each state has to maintain the supply-demand balance in its own grid which becomes the “balancing area”. Access to balancing capacity commensurate with the RE capacity planned is required in each balancing area, that is, at the level of every state.

The RE potential of a state depends on various factors like the level of solar irradiation and wind conditions. Seven states – Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan – are suitable for both wind and solar generation and account for 70% of the aggregate wind and solar capacity planned across India (MNRE 2016). These have been termed “RE rich” states.

As to generation, historically, states have had their own dedicated power plants or shares in the capacity of central public sector power plants. State distribution utilities procure a bulk of their power requirements (89% in 2011-12) through long term power purchase agreements (PPA’s) with these state owned plants and some private plants (NTPC 2012). The remaining comes from generators with ‘untied’ capacity that are either recently commissioned private plants that have not found long term customers or private plants operating as merchant producers.

Long term PPA’s pretty much fix the generation resources and balancing capacity in the portfolio of a state. They also come in the way of states pooling their balancing resources. A state looking for additional balancing capacity outside of its fixed portfolio has to find it from the limited pool of ‘untied’ generators.
For these reasons, there can be a wide mismatch between the balancing capacity in different states and the RE capacity planned for them.  


The experience of Tamil Nadu:


Tamil Nadu currently has the highest RE capacity penetration among all states with RE (largely from wind mills) accounting for 56% of its overall generation capacity. Its balancing capacity is inadequate for this level of penetration (GIZ 2015: 54, 63-65). Use of its limited reservoir-based hydro capacity for balancing is restricted by irrigation release schedules and periods of high inflows into reservoirs when hydro power generation cannot be curtailed. Neighbouring Karnataka and Telangana, which are part of the Southern Electricity Region, are rich in hydro power resources, but these are not available to Tamil Nadu. The state has no flexible gas-fired plants and limited flexibility available in its old coal-fired plants (CEA 2013:13).

Till early 2016, in the absence of capability for wind power forecasting, short term power purchases were planned after making assumptions about wind generation. If wind power generation was greater than expected, after exhausting its limited balancing options, the state utility would have only two options - either back down power from private coal plants contracted for short term power or cut off wind power plants from the grid.

Either option has been problematic for the utility - violating contract provisions in one case and not respecting the “must-run” status accorded to wind generators in the other. The dispute involving the state utility, coal-fired plants and the wind power producers is now in the courts (Vaitheeswaran 2015). Legal issues aside, there are negative economic consequences either way. Varying power from coal plants means underutilization of capacity and higher costs related to wear and tear. Backing down wind power means wasted energy.

2.    Preparations for RE


The central government’s massive RE targets require a commensurate increase in balancing capability at least in the RE rich states. Balancing resources can be augmented by dedicated transmission corridors distributing RE across states, grid storage and additional flexible generation – all long gestation infrastructure (PGCIL 2012:116). Besides resources, accurate forecasting of RE generation is essential for balancing. What follows is an assessment of the central government’s preparatory work in each of these areas.

Grid Storage


Pumped storage is not only the most widely deployed grid level energy storage technology, it also the most flexible and competitive one (GIZ 2015: 80). Pumped storage hydro electric plants store and generate electricity by moving water between reservoirs at two different heights. While India has a very limited capacity of operational pumped storage, the electricity establishment has identified a number of hydropower projects that can be developed to support pumped storage (CEA 2013: 39-43). The government however has just woken up to the need to identify concrete projects and there is talk of setting up 10GW of pumped storage (ET Bureau 2016).

Grid level battery storage technologies are evolving and in one estimate 3-8 times more expensive than pumped storage (GIZ 2015:80). There are several vested interests active in promoting these technologies including the US – India business council and the government seems to have fallen for the hype created around them. The public sector Solar Energy Corporation of India has put out tenders for solar capacity with storage components potentially driving up the cost of solar electricity (Clover 2016). The storage component is miniscule as of now and nowhere near the scale needed to be practically useful to the distribution companies (DISCOMS).

It seems that storage can be safely discounted as an option for balancing in the run up to 2022.

Forecasting and Dispersing RE

                                                                                                                                               
Renewable energy management centres (REMC’s) are to be set up in at least all the RE rich states with the responsibility for state wide forecasting of RE. The costs incurred in managing the uncertainty in predicting renewable generation will not be part of its purchase cost; these costs are to be “socialized” among grid users (CERC 2015). Till mid 2015, there was no centralized forecasting for renewable generation anywhere in India (GIZ 2015:60). Tamil Nadu has inaugurated its REMC recently (Srikanth 2016).

Transmission corridors (termed “Green Energy Corridors”) providing RE clusters in RE rich states access to neighbouring states were a part of the 12th plan. The corridors are under implementation with an enlarged scope to include connectivity to the "ultra mega solar parks" and will enable RE generators to disperse electricity in a wider geography with more balancing resources than available in the RE rich states (MoP 2016b:42).

Both the forecasting and transmission infrastructure are early work in progress and there is no visibility into when they will be ready.

Flexible generation


There is little chance of capacity addition in gas-fired thermal plants in the 2022 time frame with existing gas-fired plants running at partial capacity because of the cost of gas which has to be imported. Hydro power projects totalling over 12 GW are under construction (CEA 2015). Possibly less than half of this capacity will be amenable to flexible use. Most projects are many years behind schedule because of environmental related standoffs and opposition from local populations.

Old coal-fired plants can be made more flexible through retro-fitting. This will require capital expenditure and there are no signs that governments (who own most of these plants) are seriously considering this option. A total of 73 GW of coal capacity is under construction of which supercritical plants account for 50 GW (CEA 2016, MoEFCC 2015:72).

One can conclude that coal-fired plants, in particular super-critical ones, will be the mainstay of RE balancing. With conventional capacity addition far lower than planned RE capacity addition (of 130 GW), India’s overall “balancing potential” – the ratio of balancing capacity to RE capacity – is set to decrease in the run up to 2022.

Market for balancing capacity


The mere existence of flexibility in generation will not translate to flexible operations as the later has negative financial implications for the operator. For instance, in the case of coal-fired plants, these are due to wear and tear reducing the life of the plant, higher maintenance costs and costs associated with capacity underutilization and lower efficiency. The government is therefore moving to incentivize flexible operations. There is already a regulation to compensate generators for holding capacity in reserve for responding to grid management requests in real time. A framework for market based pricing for balancing capacity is just down the line.

Will market based incentives solve the problem of making adequate balancing capacity available in the RE rich states?

There are some constraints. Firstly, the generation capacity available in the electricity market untied to PPA’s is currently limited, though it is slated to rise with the commissioning of new plants. Secondly, inter-regional transmission constraints can come in the way of RE rich states using flexible capacity from regions other than their own.

The later problem is illustrated by the Southern Electricity Region which has been facing a generation capacity deficit for several years. Coal-fired generators in the Western Electricity region are unable to provide power to the Southern Region because of transmission bottlenecks and their capacity lies underutilized. Market based pricing for electricity has not solved the problem of electricity deficit in the southern region in five years; electricity prices at the Indian Electricity Exchange have remained significantly higher for the southern region compared to the western region from 2011 onwards (Kasturi 2016:24).

Two years after announcing massive RE targets, the government still does not have an assessment of the actual balancing capacity available with the RE rich states or how this will grow in future! It appears to believe that the market for balancing capacity will somehow solve all problems.

3.    The real cost of solar


State utilities are generally strained financially and will not be keen to purchase RE as long as it is relatively expensive. To make RE more attractive, the central government has worked out ways of subsidizing it at the cost of public sector companies in the power or fuel sector. Inter-state transmission charges for solar electricity have been waived at the cost of the PGCIL.

NTPC contracts for solar power from producers and sells it to DISCOMS after subsidizing it in the following way. It “bundles” solar power with low cost power from its coal-fired plants and offers utilities power at a rate which is lower than its purchase price for solar electricity (Upadhyay 2015). This bundled price has to approach “grid parity” – the average price of electricity contracted by utilities - for NTPC to be able to find willing buyers.

Of course, even if solar prices reach grid parity it does not mean that solar has become cost effective compared to other sources of energy. The cost of balancing variability in generation through flexible capacity held in reserve must also be attributed to solar power. To this must also be added the cost of infrastructure for forecasting RE and the costs arising from errors in forecasting. The government has not even hazarded a guess at these costs yet.

As subsidies alone are not enough to make solar power attractive, the government has also taken recourse to coercion. The new tariff policy calls for high RE purchase obligations for DISCOMS with the target for solar alone being 8% of non-hydro power consumed by every utility by 2022 (MoP 2016a). To make sure that states comply with the RPO targets, such compliance has been made part of the conditions associated with the ‘Ujwal Discom Assurance Yojana’ (UDAY) that provides relief to indebted state DISCOMS (GOI, 2015b).

Negative consequences of force feeding RE


Forcing DISCOMS to absorb RE beyond their ability to handle it will have consequences for the health of the DISCOMS and the cost and quality of electricity supply. A key assumption behind UDAY is that power costs will come down with lower cost of coal and help DISCOM finances. Rapid solar penetration will push up the cost of power.

Utilities are already hard put to handle load variation even today. They lack accurate load forecasting, flexibility in conventional generation, balancing resources such as pumped storage and generation reserves to handle different eventualities on the grid (MoP 2016b: 11). For customers, this has meant a regime of poor quality and unscheduled power cuts. With high RE penetration and an expected further deterioration in balancing potential, this regime is bound to continue in to the future. The government is also preparing to use demand curtailment curtail for balancing by pushing for large scale installation of smart meters that will allow setting time-of-day tariff (MoP, 2016a).

Public interest will be better served if the pace of solar (and wind) capacity build up is compatible with the balancing capacity available with the states and their ability to manage RE variability. The government must pay as much attention to capacity building in inter-regional transmission, pumped storage and highly flexible generation as it is doing to solar generation.

Renewable energy targets based on these considerations rather than impetuous declarations will be sustainable and allow steady decrease of carbon emissions. A slower adoption of solar generation will be beneficial for yet another reason - solar power, as long term trends suggest, will only get cheaper with time.

References:


CEA (2013): “Large scale grid integration of renewable energy sources - Way forward”, Central Electricity Authority, November, http://cea.nic.in/reports/others/ps/pspa1/large_scale_grid_integ.pdf

-  (2015): “Hydro electric projects under execution”, Central Electricity Authority, November, http://www.cea.nic.in/reports/monthly/hydro/2015/hydro_execution-11.pdf

-  (2016): “Monthly report on broad status of thermal projects in the country”, Central Electricity Authority, July, http://www.cea.nic.in/reports/monthly/broadstatus/2016/broad_status-07.pdf

CERC (2015): “Framework on Forecasting, Scheduling and Imbalance Handling for Variable Renewable Energy Sources (Wind and Solar): Statement of Reasons”, Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, http://www.cercind.gov.in/2015/regulation/SOR7.pdf

Clover, Ian (2016): “India: storage to be included in 100 MW tranche of Andhra Pradesh 750 MW solar tender”, PV Magazine, 15 March, http://www.pv-magazine.com/news/details/beitrag/india--storage-to-be-included-in-100-mw-tranche-of-andhra-pradesh-750-mw-solar-tender_100023702/#axzz4Hs5QeTPR

ET Bureau (2016): “India readies plan to improve renewable power storage”, Economic Times, 22 August, http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/energy/power/india-readies-plan-to-improve-renewable-power-storage/articleshow/53802021.cms

GIZ (2015): “Report on Forecasting, Concept of Renewable Energy Management Centres and Grid Balancing”, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) 

GOI (2015a): “Revision of cumulative targets under National Solar Mission from 20,000 MW by 2021-22 to 100000 MW”, Government of India, 17 June, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=122566

GOI (2015b): “UDAY (Ujwal DISCOM Assurance Yojana) for financial turnaround of Power Distribution Companies”, Government of India, 5 November, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=130261

Kasturi, Kannan (2016): “Private Thermal Power in a Liberal Policy Regime”, Economic & Political weekly, Vol 51, No 10, pp 22-26

Kenning Tom (2015): “India’s cutthroat solar auctions – behind the hype”, PVTECH, 22 Dec, http://www.pv-tech.org/features/indias-cutthroat-solar-auctions-behind-the-hype

MNRE (2016): “Tentative State wise break-up of Renewable Power target to be achieved by the year 2022 so that cumulative achievement is 175000 MW”, Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, http://mnre.gov.in/file-manager/UserFiles/Tentative-State-wise-break-up-of-Renewable-Power-by-2022.pdf (Sept 21, 2016)

MoEFCC (2015): “First Biennial Update Report to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change”, Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, December, http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/indbur1.pdf

MoP (2014): “Perspective Transmission Plan for twenty years (2014-2034)”, Ministry of Power, August, http://www.cea.nic.in/reports/committee/scm/allindia/notices/3rd_report.pdf

MoP (2016a): “Resolution, Tariff Policy”, Ministry of Power, Gazette of India, 28 January

MoP (2016b): “Report of the Technical Committee on Large Scale Integration of Renewable energy, Need for Balancing, Deviation Settlement Mechanism and associated issues”, Ministry of Power, April, http://powermin.nic.in/sites/default/files/uploads/Final_Consolidated_Report_RE_Technical_Committee.pdf

NTPC (2012): “Annual Report, 2011-12”, National Thermal Power Corporation, http://www.ntpc.co.in/annual-reports/720/management-discussion-and-analysis-2011

PGCIL (2012): “Transmission Plan for Envisaged Renewable Capacity, Vol 1”, Power Grid Corporation of India Limited, July, http://www.powergridindia.com/_layouts/PowerGrid/WriteReadData/file/ourBusiness/SmartGrid/Vol_1.pdf

Singh, Sarita (2016): “Power demand may be lower by 15% for five years starting FY18”, The Economic Times, 25 Apr, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2016-04-25/news/72598691_1_power-ministry-power-demand-electric-power-survey

Srikanth, R (2016): “Tangedco sets up centre to tap renewable energy”, The Hindu, 26 March, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/tamil-nadu/tangedco-sets-up-centre-to-tap-renewable-energy/article8398352.ece

Tongia, Rahul (2016): “India’s Updated (2016) Renewable Energy ‘Guidelines’: Bold targets, but can we meet them?”, Brookings India IMPACT Series, No. 082016-2.0

Upadhyay, Anindya (2015): “India's Modi Tells Coal Power Plants to Subsidize Solar”, Bloomberg, 7 September, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-07/india-tells-coal-power-plants-to-subsidize-15-gigawatts-of-solar

Vaitheesvaran, Bharani (2015): “Wind or conventional power? Tamil Nadu power producers battle it out in court”, The Economic Times, 26 August, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-08-26/news/65886398_1_must-run-status-wind-power-wind-mills


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India's outdated electricity grid needs major upgrade says expert

Thursday, March 3, 2016

How private thermal projects have fared?

This piece appeared in EPW. Reproduced in full below. The figures and tables have been copied from EPW.

Private Thermal Power in a Liberal Policy Regime


The Electricity Act, 2003 and the National Electricity Policy, 2005 put in place a highly liberal policy regime for private thermal electricity generators.

Licensing was done away with. Techno-economic clearance from the Central Electricity Authority was no longer necessary. Generators were provided open access to the transmission network, owned with but a few exceptions by state and central utilities. They could supply power to any part of India. Generators were also freed from having to enter into long term (12-25 year) power purchase agreements with distribution companies which limited profit margins. They could opt for shorter term contracts as well as sell in the power markets through traders and power exchanges.

The liberal regime resulted in an explosion of interest from private companies. This paper follows the development of private thermal power projects over a decade to determine the major impacts of this policy regime and to critique it.

Sources of data

Comprehensive data on private thermal projects is not available from a single source. With the end of the licensing regime, the Central Electricity Authority (CEA) has stopped monitoring projects except when they are close to becoming operational. Power projects however have to obtain Environmental Clearance (EC) and the Ministry of Environment, Forest, and Climate Change (MoEF) keeps track of projects that have begun the process leading to EC. Even before starting the EC process, companies typically sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the government of the state where their project is located. Additionally, companies intending to access the inter-state transmission network register access requests with the central transmission utility. A composite picture of projects in different stages of development can be pieced together from all this disparate data.

It is a painstaking task to obtain clean summary data from the MoEF database. The task can be simplified by limiting it to a subset of all India data. The choice of the subset is explained below.

India is divided into five regions in the context of electricity generation and distribution – the Southern, Northern, Western, Eastern and North Eastern Regions - defined by a transmission infrastructure that allows power generated in any state in a region to be conveyed to any other state in the same region. Electricity generated in any of these regions is largely consumed within the same region.

The highest build up of private thermal capacity in the period from 2008 (about when the earliest thermal plants conceived in the new regime would have become operational) to 2015 has been in the Western Region - composed of the states of Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Maharashtra and Goa - accounting for over 57% of the all India addition to private thermal generation capacity (Table 1).This justifies the use of data limited to the Western Region for the analysis in this paper.


The great thermal power rush

The extant of private interest in thermal power projects can be gauged from the number of projects with EC. Companies with EC for a project would have tied up with the state government for public land and water and have a plan for fuel supply. They would also have completed the mandatory “public hearing” in the project area – a gathering that is often an outlet for public opposition to a project. Only serious players would have obtained EC for their projects. (Kasturi, 2011:10)

There are two things noteworthy about private thermal projects that have obtained EC in the Western Region.

One is the sheer magnitude of the capacity planned - 79 private thermal power projects, with a combined generation capacity of 92 GW (Table 2). The latter figure can be better appreciated if it is kept in mind that all India addition of private thermal generation in the 11th plan (2007-2012) was 19 GW and the Planning Commission deemed 64 GW of thermal power addition (private and public included) during the 12th plan period (2012-2017) sufficient to meet the requirements of the country with GDP growing at nine percent (Planning Commission, 2012:1.4.1)! The government of the day appears to have been fully aware that many of these proposals would not fructify.

Second is the bunching of proposals between 2006 and 2010 (Table 2). The interest in projects rapidly peaked and had all but petered out by 2011. There has been no fresh private interest in thermal plants in the Western Region since 2011 (with but one or two exceptions who do not have EC yet). The negative consequences of this bunching are briefly touched upon later. The changing interest in thermal power strongly relates to the rapidly changing economics of thermal power production of this period.

With permission to sell electricity in the market, captive generators made good profits in the prevailing conditions of electricity scarcity, early on under the liberal regime established by the Electricity Act, 2003. Jindal Steel and Power (JSP), a captive generator itself, went on to establish a thermal plant in 2007 operating exclusively as a merchant supplier without any long term power purchase agreements (PPA’s) and made super profits during the period 2007 to 2010 (Joshi, 2009). The success of merchant producers and JSP in particular very likely attracted many entrants into thermal power.

From 2010, the situation turned unfavourable. With the production of coal stagnating, the government stopped giving long term coal linkages to power plants from 2011. International coal prices increased rapidly all of 2010, peaking in early 2011 and importing fuel was not a good option. The biggest dampener was that merchant electricity rates dropped sharply during the second half of 2010 and thereafter stayed low in the Western Region (Figure 1). Other regions with the sole exception of the Southern Region also showed similar falling prices.


Under these changed circumstances, many thermal projects were put on hold and others abandoned.

The cost of stalled and abandoned projects

Chhattisgarh in the Western Region is a case study of some of the excesses and “externalities” of the new policy regime. The state advertised itself as the upcoming “power hub”, an exporter of electricity to the rest of the country, and signed as many as 61 MOU’s for thermal power.

40 projects, two thirds of the number proposed, have not completed the formalities needed for environment clearance (Table 3). All these projects were announced many years ago and the overriding reason for them not to have progressed appears to be the changed economics of thermal power generation described earlier. Of the 21 projects with EC, 10 are operational, mostly with only partial capacity on stream (Table 3). A few are under construction but extremely delayed. A few others appear to be stalled. In all, only about a quarter of the proposed thermal projects in Chhattisgarh may materialize.

For proponents of competition the failure of some projects may not be of concern. The failed projects however not just cost their investors. They come at great cost to the agricultural communities amidst whom they are located. Almost all stalled projects with EC have acquired all the land they would have needed and the land requirement for thermal plants is substantial – 700 to 900 acres for every 1000 MW plant. At least 17 of the projects that have not even obtained EC have acquired part or all of the land for their proposed plants. The early land acquisition has been encouraged by government itself in the past for providing coal linkages which in turn was necessary for obtaining EC (Kasturi, 2011:11).

Skewed addition of generation capacity

Private thermal generation plants that have proliferated under the new policy regime have aggravated the imbalance between installed generation capacity and energy requirement in the different regions (Figure 2). The Western Region has become relatively capacity surplus while the North and South regions have a capacity deficit. Given that nearly half of the increase in total all India generation capacity came from private thermal plants and that nearly 64% of this was in the Western Region, this region was bound to become relatively over endowed with generation capacity (Table 1).



The surplus capacity in some regions and capacity deficit in others may not be an issue if there is adequate inter-regional transmission capacity. Starting from 2010, the market has existed for export of electricity from Western Region to the Southern Region. The relative electricity surplus in the Western Region (WR) and deficit in the Southern Region (SR) is seen in the different prices registered for the two regions at the IEX (Figure 1). The problems of inter-regional transmission are illustrated by the WR-SR energy exchanges.

Actual imports from WR into SR increased only marginally from 2010 through 2013, limited by the nominal transmission capacity (Table 4). The nominal transmission capacity cannot be entirely utilized in practice as margins need to be kept aside for technical reasons; the table also shows actual imports.


Capacity enhancements happened in 2014 with the opening of the first of two 2100 MW links between Sholapur in Maharashtra and Raichur in Karnataka. However, even with the much higher nominal transmission capacity available, the average power transferred from Western to the Southern region went up only by small amounts.

The reason behind this is that power transfers require end to end transmission capacity between generating centres and load centres. Even if the inter-regional transmission capacity - which is the capacity of links across the region borders – is adequate, there may be bottlenecks elsewhere on the end-to-end corridor. In the present case, the transmission capacity from WR generating clusters (such as those in Chhattisgarh) to Sholapur and from Raichur to the SR load centres is lacking. In 2014-15, only 1172 MW of power, equivalent to a capacity transfer of 1500 MW or about 0.6% of all India generation capacity for the year, could be transferred from WR to SR. [2] This was far below Southern Regions requirement and Western Regions available surplus (Figure 3).

Idle generators amidst electricity scarcity

The skewed regional addition of generation capacity in the new policy regime has its direct consequences. The plant load factor (PLF) has serially decreased in the Western Region except for Gujarat, and is now at 43% (Table 5).

While coal availability would have been considered the problem some years back, it appears that it is no longer so. In FY15, coal India production increased by 32 MT, more than the cumulative increases in production in the previous four years. Coal stocks in state plants have gone up. International coal prices have come down. The problem appears to be that there are no customers for the power generated by these power producers.


The electricity distribution companies (discoms) in the Western Region cannot absorb more power in their current situation. This of course does not mean that electricity has reached every household in this region or that there is round the clock supply. It only means that the discoms have met their stated requirements – limited by their transmission network, their distribution reach and their financial ability to buy more power. Export to the Southern Region – where Karnataka is facing a severe electricity crisis because of a deficit monsoon crippling its hydropower generation – is not possible because of lack of transmission capacity. These power producers have been stranded.

Issues in developing generation and transmission capacity in step

Before the advent of the new regime, electricity generation in India was planned to keep each region self sufficient. States developed their generation and transmission infrastructure in tandem. The centre, while establishing new generating units in a state also developed the inter-state and inter-regional transmission systems required to deliver the power to the states allocated power from the unit. In addition, a few transmission links were built by the centre across region boundaries specifically to exchange power.

The National Electricity Policy, 2005 declares that network planning and implementation should be based on the transmission needs arising from the open access regime and not contingent on a prior agreement with the users (MoP, 2005:5.3.2). Considering that generating units can target customers anywhere in the country and transmission systems are expensive and have to be built with long term needs in mind, this appears to be wishful thinking under present conditions of India.

Optimal design of transmission systems requires knowledge of the location, capacity and time frame of commissioning of each new generation plant as well as its intended customers. Multiple agencies must work to enhance intra-state, inter-state and inter-regional networks in a coordinated manner to ensure the required transmission capacity end to end (CEA 2012:7.4.2).

Transmission planning has become extremely difficult in the new regime as power plants are no longer required to enter into long term PPA’s with distribution utilities. Many private generation plants staking claims for long term access to the transmission network have not specified end users for their power as they have not (on purpose) or could not (because of lack of tenders) enter into long term PPAs with distribution utilities. Further, they are not accountable for their schedule of commissioning (PGCIL, 2010).

For the transmission utilities, as of now almost entirely owned by the states and the centre, the above uncertainties put at risk the investment in transmission infrastructure and can lead to a situation where there is sub-optimal utilization of the network. Generation plants on the other hand can be denied access because of congestion, as is happening today (Planning Commission 2012:2.2.2).

Concluding remarks

The extremely liberal regime ushered in by the Electricity Act 2003 allowed the few existing private captive thermal generators to make handsome profits. This attracted a large number of private companies to venture into thermal power generation, particularly in certain regions with perceived advantages in terms of availability of coal and water. The changing economics of thermal power production however quickly lead to this interest petering out.

The majority of proposed projects were abandoned, but not without cost to the communities of the area they were to be located in. Of the rest, only a few are operational with partial capacity while others are under construction with delayed schedules or have gone into limbo.

The location of the functional plants serves to further exacerbate the regional imbalance between demand and generation capacity. Not being able to sell their electricity locally because of lack of immediate demand and in power deficit regions because of the lack of adequate transmission capacity to load centres, these plants idle or run at low PLF’s even as parts of the country reel under severe electricity shortage. The overall development of the private thermal power sector shows a far from optimal utilization of national resources.

There are yet other negative consequences for the electricity sector which are not detailed in this paper. The rush to build thermal plants created a spurt in demand for capital equipment that was taken advantage of by foreign manufactures at the cost of domestic manufacturing. This is apparent in the details of executing agencies and equipment suppliers of private plants captured by CEA (CEA, 2015). State owned banks, the main lenders to dysfunctional power projects are burdened with huge non-performing assets (Acharya, 2012). This also makes it harder for newer entrants into the power sector to obtain financing for their projects.

Each of these problems can be seen as caused by a failure of coordination, adequate due diligence and so on. Taken together, they point to the infirmities in the legal and policy framework. The framework acknowledges the heavily capital intensive nature of the industry and the need for a planned approach to electricity for the optimal utilization of national resources to serve the economy. Yet it allows private generation companies unfettered freedom to set up plants without reference to timing, location or quantity all in the name of efficiency through competition.

The present government meanwhile has shifted its focus to solar energy. It is pushing humungous targets for solar generation capacity addition - reminiscent of the previous governments push for thermal energy - without addressing any of the issues that have severely impacted thermal energy development.

References

— (2015): “Monthly Report on Broad Status of Thermal Projects in the Country, April 2015,” Central Electricity Authority, Ministry of Power, 29 May.
Kasturi, Kannan (2011): “New Thermal Power Clusters,” Economic & Political Weekly, 1 October.
MoP (2005): “National Electricity Policy 2005,” Ministry of Power, 12 February, available in http://pib.nic.in/archieve/others/2005/nep20050209.pdf.
Joshi, Rishi (2009): “Merchant of Power,” Business Today, 4th October


Notes:


[1] Average actual utilized capacity (MW)  = (Actual transfer in a year (MU)) * (1000/(24*365))
[2] The equivalent generation capacity has been arrived at by assuming a plant operating at 75% PLF to generate  1172 MW